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CAPLIN & DR YSDALE v. UNITED STATES AND
UNITED STATES v. MONSANTO: FORFEITURE
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees crimi-
nal defendants the right to attorney representation.' An essential compo-
nent of a defendant's right to counsel is the right to retain counsel of choice.2
The right to counsel of choice secures the effective operation of the adver-
sarial system, preserving the balance of power between the government and a
criminal defendant.' However, in interpreting the sixth amendment, courts
have limited the right to counsel of choice. Specifically, a defendant's right
to counsel of choice may be limited by the defendant's ability to pay for an
attorney's services4 and the government's interest in the orderly administra-
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); see also Wheat v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 1692, 1696-97 (1988) ("the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an
effective advocate for each criminal defendant .... "); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
653-54 (1984) ("An accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component
of our criminal justice system."); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) ("This
[sixth amendment] right [to counsel], fundamental to our system of justice, is meant to assure
fairness in the adversary criminal process."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
("The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essen-
tial to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462
(1938) ("This [right to counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.").
2. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) ("defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice"); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th
Cir. 1981) (counsel of choice is an "essential component" of the sixth amendment), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
3. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2672-74 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (when the government appoints defendant's counsel, the relationship of trust
between counsel and defendant is undermined); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685
(1984) (right to counsel accords the defendant "ample opportunity to meet the case of the
prosecution" through the skill and knowledge of counsel); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
307 (1973) (counsel functions as a guide through complex legal technicalities); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) ("assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence
of a fair trial").
4. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("quality of a crimi-
nal defendant's representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel
money can buy"); see United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("ac-
cused who is financially able to retain counsel must not be deprived of the opportunity to do
so"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
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tion of justice.5 In addition, Congress imposed restrictions on a defendant's
right to counsel of choice through enactment of the criminal forfeiture provi-
sions in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) sec-
tions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 19706 and the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) sections of the Controlled Substances Act.7
In 1970, Congress enacted criminal forfeiture provisions in the RICO and
CCE statutes8 in an attempt to terminate illegal drug and racketeering enter-
prises in the United States.9 However, the original forfeiture provisions
proved ineffective due to statutory ambiguity and procedural limitations.'o
Therefore, in 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
(CFA or the Act)1 to clarify the scope of the criminal forfeiture provi-
5. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (denial of a justifiable request for
continuance to expedite trial renders the right to counsel "an empty formality"); Sampley v.
Attorney Gen., 786 F.2d 610, 613 (4th Cir.) ("defendant has no constitutional right to dictate
the time [of his trial] by objecting that counsel then retained or assigned is not presently 'coun-
sel of his choice' "), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1008 (1986).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
7. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA or the Act)
added section 853 to the CCE. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 303, 98 Stat. 1837, 2044-51 (1984)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. V 1987) and 21 U.S.C. § 253 (Supp. V 1987));
see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
8. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-
66 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. V 1987)).
9. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 194, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3377 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225]. Congress enacted the RICO and
CCE statutes recognizing that the traditional sanctions of fine and imprisonment were ineffec-
tive in deterring illegal drug and racketeering operations. Id.
10. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 3375; see also id. at 194 (scope of property subject to forfeiture was too narrow),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3377; id. at 195 (criminal forfeiture
provisions "fail adequately to address the phenomenon of defendants defeating forfeiture by
removing, transferring, or concealing their assets prior to conviction"), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3378.
11. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 302-303, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (1984) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. V 1987) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. V 1987)). Congress passed the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act as Title III of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.
This Note concerns only the criminal forfeiture provisions of the CFA codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853. References in this Note to the CFA will refer only to the criminal
forfeiture provisions of the Act.
Because the language and legislative history of the 1984 RICO and CCE forfeiture amend-
ments are virtually identical, the courts have construed the statutes together. See United
States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("18 U.S.C. § 1963 is the
RICO forfeiture provision which was included in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
and is a mirror of 21 U.S.C. § 853. The cases discussing forfeiture of attorneys' fees under 18
U.S.C. § 1963 are therefore fully applicable to forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 853.").
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sions. 2 Enforcement of these CFA provisions can affect a criminal defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice in two ways. First, the
forfeiture provisions allow the government to restrain a defendant from us-
ing private assets to retain counsel of choice by freezing the defendant's as-
sets prior to, or upon obtaining a RICO or CCE forfeiture count in the
indictment or information.' 3 Second, the possibility that unrestrained assets
will be subject to forfeiture after trial arguably chills defense counsel's will-
ingness to accept RICO and CCE clients.
The issue of whether the government can constitutionally apply the RICO
and CCE forfeiture provisions to restrict a defendant's choice of counsel
sparked considerable debate between the federal circuit courts of appeal
1 4
and commentators. 5 In 1989, however, the United States Supreme Court
12. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 192-96, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3375-79; see infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
14. Three circuit courts of appeal have held that the statute must be read to exempt suffi-
cient funds for the defendant to retain counsel of choice. United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit
No. 8 of Shop in the Grove Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445, 1450-52 (8th Cir.), mandate stayed,
864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402-04 (2d Cir.
1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989); United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th
Cir. 1988), rev'd en banc, 877 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463,
1474-75 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
Many district courts applied the same analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Truglio, 660 F.
Supp. 103, 106 (N.D. W. Va. 1987); United States v. Madeoy, 652 F. Supp. 371, 376-77
(D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (emphasizing
that size of legitimate fees must be reasonable), appeal dismissed, 852 F.2d 239 (7th Cir.), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming judgment but
not endorsing reasoning), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3221 (1989); United States v. Figueroa, 645
F. Supp. 453, 456-57 (W.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1346-49 (D. Colo. 1985).
Four circuit courts of appeal have held that the criminal forfeiture provisions of these stat-
utes encompass legitimate defense attorney fees and that such forfeiture does not necessarily
violate the fifth or sixth amendments. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 reh'g
denied sub nom. Caraballo-Sandoval v. United States, 874 F.2d 821 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 213 (1989); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988) (how-
ever pretrial post-indictment hearing is required to meet due process guarantees), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3221 (1989); United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 390-91 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1353 (1989); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1505 (10th Cir. 1988);
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2650-
51, 2656-57 (1989).
Some district courts applied the same analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 666 F.
Supp. 1275, 1277 (E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2,
1985 (Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 767
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. See generally Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE
Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493 (1986) (RICO and CCE forfeiture
provisions encompass attorney fees and any resulting sixth amendment concerns are over-
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
resolved this uncertainty, In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States16 and
United States v. Monsanto, '" the Supreme Court held that attorney fees are
not exempt from the federal forfeiture provisions contained in the RICO and
CCE statutes." Further, the Court stated that its interpretation of the stat-
ute to include assets needed to pay private counsel did not raise any fifth or
sixth amendment concerns.' 9 The majority also concluded that the RICO
and CCE statutes authorize the pretrial restraint of potentially forfeitable
assets which a defendant may wish to use to pay an attorney and that such
judicial restraint of the assets is constitutional.2"
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto both arose from illegal drug trafficking
prosecutions. In Caplin & Drysdale, federal prosecutors charged Christo-
pher F. Reckmeyer with various tax evasion and CCE violations.
Reckmeyer pled guilty to two tax evasion counts and the CCE count upon
which forfeiture of virtually all his assets was based.2' The jury sentenced
Reckmeyer22 and ordered him to forfeit the property listed in the indictment
to the United States.23 Pursuant to the court's recommendation, defense
counsel Caplin & Drysdale filed for a post-conviction third-party proceed-
stated); Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to
Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. I (arguing that forfeiture of de-
fense attorney fees under the RICO and CCE provisions violates a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel); Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1986)
(arguing that Congress could enact a constitutional RICO and CCE fee forfeiture provision
but the present RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions are unconstitutional because they raise
unnecessary conflicts of interest between a defendant and an attorney); Note, Against Forfei-
ture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defend-
ants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124 (1986) (RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions should be
interpreted to exclude attorney fees); Note, Attorneys'Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984: Can We Protect Against Sham Transfers to Attorneys?, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 734 (1987) (bona fide attorney fees should not be forfeitable under the RICO
and CCE provisions, and such forfeiture provisions should be amended to provide for a post-
conviction attorney fee hearing); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be
Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 663 (1987) (attorney fees should be exempt from forfeiture under the RICO and CCE
provisions).
16. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
17. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
18. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662-65.
19. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2651-57. The Court's consideration of fifth amend-
ment concerns was limited to a discussion of the CFA's impact on the adversarial system. Id.
at 2656-57. The Court declined to consider a procedural due process challenge to the CFA.
Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2666 n.10; see infra text accompanying notes 261-67.
20. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665-67.
21. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd en banc, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
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24
ing, as allowed under the CFA, to claim unpaid legal fees and expenses.
The government acknowledged the reasonableness of the Caplin & Drysdale
fee petition, but alleged that the CFA relation back doctrine, which vests
title of the defendant's assets in the government upon the commission of the
illegal act, precluded any payment of fees.2 ' The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered the government to pay the
fees owing to Caplin & Drysdale for legitimately performed legal services.
2 6
Upon the government's appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. 27 The
Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and reversed the panel decision,28
finding that the CFA provisions permitted the forfeiture of assets a defend-
ant uses or intends to use to hire an attorney of choice.
29
In United States v. Monsanto, federal prosecutors alleged that Peter Mon-
santo directed a large illegal drug trafficking operation.3 ° A grand jury in-
dicted the defendant on both RICO and CCE counts.3 1 The indictment also
listed various assets that the government claimed were subject to forfeiture
under the CCE statute.3 2 The government received an order restraining the
defendant's use of the listed assets effective the same day the indictment is-
sued.33 Monsanto moved to modify or vacate the restraining order to use his
assets to retain counsel. 34 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied Monsanto's request, stating that Congress did
not intend to exclude attorney fees from the scope of the CCE forfeiture
provisions.35 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court decision and remanded the case for a pre-
trial adversary hearing to consider the government's restraint of the defend-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1193-94; see infra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
26. Id. at 1198.
27. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (Reckmeyer was consolidated
for appeal with United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1985) and United States v.
Harvey, No. 85-00224-A (E.D. Va. 1986)), rev'd en banc, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd
sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
28. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct.
2646 (1989).
29. Id. at 641.
30. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1401 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657
(1989).
31. Id.
32. The indictment specified two parcels of residential property, valued at $335,000 and
$30,000, as well as $35,000 in cash, as property subject to forfeiture. Id.
33. The court entered an ex parte order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) prohibiting
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ant's assets.3 6 On remand, the district court held an adversary hearing and
found the order restraining the potentially forfeitable property valid.37 The
Second Circuit granted rehearing en banc, reversed the district court deci-
sion, and ordered the district court to modify its restraining order to permit
the defendant's use of his assets to retain defense counsel of his choice.3"
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Caplin & Drysdale39 and reversed the decision of the Second Circuit
in Monsanto.' Justice White, who delivered the opinion of the Court in
each case, interpreted the statutory language and the legislative history of
the CFA to support application of the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions
to assets a criminal defendant uses or intends to use to retain private coun-
sel. 4 The Court also determined that its interpretation of the statute raised
no fifth or sixth amendment concerns.
42
In a single dissent to the Court's Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto deci-
sions, Justice Blackmun analyzed the legislative language of the RICO and
CCE forfeiture provisions in light of Congress' intent in enacting the CFA.
The dissent concluded that Congress did not intend the RICO and CCE
forfeiture provisions to encompass assets needed to pay attorney fees. 43 The
dissent further asserted that if the CFA, as written, does authorize such for-
feiture, then the Court should have declared the provisions in violation of
the sixth amendment of the Constitution."
This Note compares the distinctions between civil and criminal forfeiture
and their application in the context of United States federal law. It examines
the CFA, focusing on the background, development, and enactment of its
criminal forfeiture provisions. This Note also traces the federal circuit court
case law, in particular the decisions of Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto, as
illustrative of the circuit split concerning whether application of the criminal
forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE unconstitutionally infringe upon a
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. This Note then ex-
amines the Supreme Court's majority opinions in both cases and the opinion
of the dissent. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court's decisions in
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1402.
38. Id. at 1400.
39. 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2650 (1989).
40. 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2661 (1989). The Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto also re-
manded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further
proceedings. Id. at 2667.
41. Id. at 2662-67.
42. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2651-57.
43. Id. at 2668-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2672-78.
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Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto fail to balance adequately a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional rights against the public's interest in deterring racke-
teering and illegal drug operations. As a result, it suggests that the Supreme
Court should now decide whether the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions
violate a defendant's fifth amendment right to procedural due process. In
addition, Congress should, at a minimum, amend the statutes to clarify the
discretion of a district court to determine asset restraint and forfeiture under
the RICO and CCE provisions.
I. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
ENACTMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE FORFEITURE ACT
A. Criminal and Civil Forfeiture in the United States: The Bias Against
Criminal Forfeiture
Federal law recognizes two types of forfeiture: civil4 5 and criminal."
Civil, or in rem forfeiture, is directed against property4 7 and based on a com-
mon law fiction that the forfeitable property is guilty of the wrongdoing.
48
In the civil context, the law considers the property subject to forfeiture
tainted by the act of the offender. Therefore, under this theory, the govern-
ment's right to the tainted property vests at the time of the illegal act,
thereby voiding all third-party transfers occurring between the time of the
illegal act and the government's forfeiture of the property.4 9
Criminal, or in personam forfeiture, on the other hand, is directed against
the person and is based on a determination of the defendant's guilt. 50 Ac-
cording to this theory, a trier of fact must find that the defendant is guilty of
a crime and that the defendant's property in question had some nexus with
the charged illegal activity." If a trier of fact makes such a determination,
the defendant must forfeit the property to the government.52 In contrast to
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (in rem forfeiture provision).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. V 1987) (RICO criminal forfeiture provision); 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 (Supp. V 1987) (CCE criminal forfeiture provision).
47. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971).
48. Id.
49. See Comment, Criminal Forfeiture.- Attacking the Economic Dimensions of Organized
Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 227, 232-33 (1982).
50. See id. at 232.
5 1. See Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felo-
nies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, I 1 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 613, 623 (1984).
52. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 191 (citing rules 3 1(e) and 32(b)(2) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure), 193-94, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3376-77. The government must allege criminal forfeiture in the information or in-
dictment. Id. If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense, then a special verdict
19891
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civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture never gained wide acceptance in the
United States.
53
B. Development of the RICO and CCE Statutes:
Criminal Forfeiture Revived
Passage of the 1970 RICO5 and CCE55 statutes established the first crim-
inal forfeiture provisions in the United States since 1863.56 Congress en-
acted these statutes to deter racketeering and drug trafficking operations.57
The RICO statute required a defendant convicted of racketeering58 to forfeit
any "interest" in the criminal enterprise.59 Similarly, the CCE statute re-
quired a defendant convicted of illegal drug trafficking to forfeit all "profits"
derived from the criminal enterprise.' Congress intended the criminal for-
feiture provisions to diminish the economic incentive of participating in
these criminal operations.
6'
The 1970 RICO and CCE provisions, however, failed as an effective law
enforcement tool.62 Defendants frequently defeated these forfeiture provi-
must be returned with respect to the forfeiture allegations and a judgment of forfeiture entered
against the defendant. Id.
53. See Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL.
L. REV. 225, 231 (1981). The author identifies three primary factors discouraging criminal
forfeiture in the United States: the colonial governments did not want American property
forfeited to the Crown, most felons had nothing to forfeit, and the colonial government's con-
cern over the effect of the penalty on innocent family members. Id. The United States Consti-
tution also banned forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for treason. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of
the Person attainted.").
54. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
55. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
56. Confiscation Act, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589, 590 (1862) (authorizing the President to
seize the life estates of confederate soldiers).
57. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 194, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3377.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
59. Id. § 1963(a)(1) (1982).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982).
61. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3374.
62. Id. See generally COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET
FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATrING DRUG TRAFFICKING 9 (1981) (Gen-
eral Accounting Office determined that the ineffectiveness of the 1970 RICO and CCE forfei-
ture provisions resulted from statutory flaws and limited use of the provisions by the
Department of Justice.).
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sions by transferring or concealing their assets prior to conviction.63 In ad-
dition, the RICO and CCE statutes narrowly circumscribed the type of
property subject to forfeiture. In 1984, Congress responded to the statutory
shortfalls of the criminal forfeiture provisions by enacting the CFA 6  to
amend the original RICO and CCE statutes. The CFA criminal forfeiture
provisions reflect congressional intent to expand the scope of property sub-
ject to forfeiture,65 broaden the class of offenses for which criminal forfeiture
is possible,66 and facilitate the forfeiture procedure.
67
C. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: A Powerful Law
Enforcement Measure
The CFA effected several important changes in criminal forfeiture law.
68
The Act amended CCE section 853(a) and RICO section 1963(a) to provide
that a defendant convicted of violating the RICO or CCE statutes shall for-
feit to the United States "any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly" from the viola-
tion69 or any property used in the commission of the offense.7" The Act
63. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 194-97, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3377-80.
64. Congress passed the CFA as a part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
(CCCA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57. Section 302 of Title III of the CCCA
amended RICO forfeiture provisions codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. V 1987). Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-44. Section 303 of Title III of the CCCA amended the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853
(Supp. V 1987). Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 303, 98 Stat. 1837, 2044-51.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1987); see also infra notes 69-72 and accompany-
ing text.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); see also infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e), (m); see also infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
68. For an extensive analysis of the CFA, see Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under The Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747 (1985).
While the CFA made no specific reference to attorney fees, it significantly affected whether
attorney fees are subject to the criminal forfeiture provisions.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3) (Supp. V 1987). Section
1963 of RICO provides in relevant part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall
forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law -





(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over;
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defines property to include real property and tangible and intangible per-
sonal property. 7' Thus, property associated with a transaction in violation
of RICO or CCE is forfeitable. If only a portion of a defendant's assets are
derived from the illegal activity, the defendant's legitimate gains are not sub-
ject to forfeiture.72
Of equal importance are CCE section 853(c) and RICO section 1963(c),
which revise the timetable under which the government's interest in the for-
feited property vests.73 These provisions provide that although criminal for-
feiture is available only upon the conviction of the defendant, the "relation
back" doctrine vests the United States' interest in the forfeited property at
the time of the offense rather than at the time of the defendant's convic-
tion.7' These relation back provisions essentially borrow the taint concept
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection
in violation of section 1962.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any other
sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States
all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by
this section, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may
be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(a).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); 21 U.S.C. § 853(b). Section 1963 provides in relevant part:
(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes -
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land;
and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, in-
terests, claims, and securities.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(b).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1); see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at
199 (stating that property is forfeitable "only to the extent that [it is] derived from racketeering
activity or unlawful debt collection"), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
3382.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Section 1963 provides in relevant part:
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than
the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall
be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing
pursuant to subsection (1) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property
who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
74. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 200, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3383.
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traditionally employed in civil forfeiture proceedings.7 5 Congress enacted
these sections so that the United States' interest in the property could not be
extinguished by a defendant's transfer of the property to a third-party prior
to conviction.76
RICO section 1961(1) and CCE section 853(a) broaden the types of of-
fenses for which property is subject to criminal forfeiture. Specifically, these
provisions subject assets associated with all illegal drug offenses and with
other specified crimes to criminal forfeiture. 77 Approximately twenty-five
percent of criminal charges brought in federal court fall within the CFA
expanded criminal forfeiture provisions.78
The CFA also codifies a number of changes in the criminal forfeiture pro-
cedures. Specifically, the CFA establishes new procedures for the issuance
of restraining orders restricting a defendant's access to potentially forfeitable
assets.7 9 Under RICO section 1963(d) and CCE section 853(e), a restraining
order can issue prior to the filing of an indictment, after notice and an oppor-
75. See Reed, supra note 68, at 757; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 200-01, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3383-84.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). Other specified crimes include such offenses
as violations of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, bribery, gambling, and
dealing in obscene materials. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a).
78. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Hughes &
O'Connel, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion ofa
Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613, 623 (1984)).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e). Section 1963 of RICO provides in relevant
part:
(d)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining
order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take
any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a)
for forfeiture under this section -
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of section
1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is
sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section;
or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to per-
sons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the
court determines that -
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the
issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property
being destroyed, removed from thejurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made
unavailable for forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of
the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the or-
der is to be entered:
Provided, however, That an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effec-
tive for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good cause
19891
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tunity for a hearing."0 To secure a pre-indictment restraining order, the gov-
ernment must show a substantial probability that it will prevail on the issue
of forfeiture, that failure to restrain such assets will result in the property
being removed from the court's jurisdiction, and that the need to preserve
the potentially forfeitable assets outweighs the defendant's hardship.8" A
court may also issue an ex parte restraining order, on a temporary basis,
after the United States establishes probable cause that the property is subject
to forfeiture and that notice to the defendant would jeopardize the availabil-
ity of the property. 2 In addition, the CFA provides for the issuance of re-
straining orders upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a
RICO or a CCE violation and stating that upon conviction, such property
would be subject to forfeiture.8 3 For post-indictment restraining orders, the
probable cause established in the indictment or information satisfies the re-
quirements for issuance of the order.8 4 Congress enacted these provisions to
preserve the availability of the assets pending disposition of the criminal
case.
8 5
shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A) has
been filed.
(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon ap-
plication of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an
information or indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the
United States demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject
to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availa-
bility of the property for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more
than ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause
shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a
longer period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under this para-
graph shall be held at the earliest possible time, and prior to the expiration of the
temporary order.
(3) The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant to this subsec-
tion, evidence and information that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(d); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B); see supra note 79. Compare 18
U.S.C. § 1963(e) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) with FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (establishing the criteria
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)). The restraining order provisions of
the RICO and CCE statutes parallel the traditional requirements for securing a TRO, except
that rule 65(b) requires an immediate post-restraint adversary hearing for TROs issued with-
out notice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B)(i)-(ii); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(l)(B)(i)-(ii); see supra note 79.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2); see supra note 79.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(l)(A); see supra note 79.
84. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 202, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3385.
85. Id. at 204, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3387.
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One final procedural change significantly affects the question of attorney
fee forfeiture. Pursuant to RICO section 1963() and CCE section 853(n), a
court may hold a post-conviction ancillary hearing, if so requested, to permit
third-parties to assert their claims to the forfeited property. 6 To defeat the
United States' claim to the forfeited property, a third-party must be the bona
fide purchaser of the property and establish that, at the time of the purchase,
the purchaser was "reasonably without cause to believe that the property
was subject to forfeiture." 7
Viewed as a whole, the CFA criminal forfeiture provisions appear to apply
to all assets that have a sufficient connection with illegal RICO or CCE ac-
tivity. The literal language of the CFA creates no exception either in its
definition of property subject to forfeiture 8 or in its third-party forfeiture
provisions 9 for a criminal defendant to pay an attorney for legitimate serv-
ices rendered in connection with a RICO or CCE prosecution.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE CFA:
CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Although the statutory language of the CFA criminal forfeiture provisions
appears clear, the federal circuit courts of appeals that considered such pro-
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). RICO subsection 1963(o provides in rele-
vant part:
(2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property
which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may,
within thirty days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice under
paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the
validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall be held before the
court alone, without a jury.
(6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by
a preponderance of the evidence that -
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such
right ,-title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part
because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the
defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the
time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the prop-
erty under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or inter-
est in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section;
the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its
determination.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(/); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1963()(6); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); see supra note 86.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); 21 U.S.C. § 853(b); see supra note 71.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n); see supra note 86.
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visions interpreted the statute and its legislative history in diverse and incon-
sistent manners. The circuit courts disagreed concerning both the
application of the CFA to attorney fees and whether application of the pro-
vision implicated constitutional concerns. In Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States, 90 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
the criminal forfeiture provisions of the CFA encompass legitimate defense
attorney fees and that forfeiture under those provisions did not implicate a
defendant's sixth amendment rights."a Conversely, in United States v. Mon-
santo,a2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit consid-
ered the application of the CFA to attorney fees and held that the defendant
could use certain potentially forfeitable assets to retain private counsel. 93
The dichotomy and confusion which existed among the circuit courts re-
garding attorney fee forfeiture is effectively illustrated by juxtaposing the
facts and lower court decisions in Caplin & Drysdale with Monsanto.
A. Attorney Fees Subject to CFA Forfeiture -
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States
In Caplin & Drysdale, the Fourth Circuit encountered the attorney fee
forfeiture issue within the context of a post-conviction claim by defense
counsel to recover fees from assets forfeited to the United States.94 The case
involved a defendant who pled guilty to various criminal counts, including
the CCE count upon which forfeiture of virtually all his assets was based.95
Following the judge's forfeiture decision and sentencing of the defendant,
9 6
defense counsel, Caplin & Drysdale, filed for a post-conviction third-party
hearing to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. 97
The district court ordered the government to pay Caplin & Drysdale for
legitimately performed legal services.9" The court stated that Congress had
not intended the CFA to encompass the forfeiture of bona fide attorney
90. 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
91. Id. at 649.
92. 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
93. Id. at 1401-02.
94. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct.
2646 (1989).
95. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd en banc, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
96. Id. at 1192-93. The court sentenced Reckmeyer to 17 years in prison for violating the
CCE statute. The court also imposed two two-year sentences upon Reckmeyer for his tax
violations which were to run concurrently with the CCE sentence. United States v.
Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d at 1217 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986).
97. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1193.
98. Id. at 1198.
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fees. 99 Further, the court asserted that interpreting the statute to allow for-
feiture of such fees would violate a defendant's sixth amendment right, by
preventing the retention of counsel of choice."o Moreover, the district court
noted that interpreting the CFA forfeiture provisions to include such fees
would violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment by creating con-
flicts between defense counsel and the criminal defendant that "would un-
dermine the adversary system." 10 1
On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district
court's order. 102 While the Fourth Circuit panel found that the CFA forfei-
ture provisions encompassed legitimate attorney fees, 10 3 the panel deter-
mined that such an interpretation of the statute rendered it unconstitutional
because it violated a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice."° However, the Fourth Circuit granted rehearing of Caplin & Drys-
dale en banc and reversed the panel decision. 05
The en banc court agreed with the Fourth Circuit panel's statutory deter-
mination 10 6 that the CFA unmistakably provides that property used or in-
tended to be used for attorney fees is subject to forfeiture. The court
maintained that the literal language of the statute subjected the defendant's
assets to forfeiture regardless of their possible use. 10 7 Because the court
found the statute unambiguous, it found resort to the legislative history of
the Act unnecessary.'08 Nevertheless, the court stated that the plain mean-
ing of the statute should not be enforced if it would contravene express legis-
lative intent. 1  Having established that the language of the statute provided
no express exemption for attorney fees, the court examined whether enforce-
ment of the statute would contravene express legislative intent. 110 The court
concluded that the legislative history of the Act revealed no congressional
intent to exempt attorney fees.111
99. Id. at 1195.
100. Id. at 1196-98.
101. Id. at 1197.
102. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 931 (4th Cir. 1987). For the background of
the Reckmeyer case, see supra note 27.
103. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 913-17.
104. Id. at 926-27.
105. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S.
Ct. 2646 (1989).
106. Id. at 641-42.
107. Id. at 642.
108. Id. at 641.
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After determining that the panel decision correctly interpreted the Act,
the court turned to the panel's constitutional analysis, wherein the en banc
court reversed.' 12 Citing prior Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that implicit in due process is the right to representation.' 
13
However, the court reasoned that the CFA forfeiture provisions did not
threaten the sixth amendment right to representation because either counsel
privately retained or counsel appointed and paid by the government under
the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act' 14 would satisfy this interest." 5
Moreover, in the forfeiture context, the court noted that if a defendant's sole
resources are subject to forfeiture under the CFA, legal ownership of the
assets is in question. 116 According to the court, a defendant does not acquire
a right to an attorney of choice unless the resources in his possession are
clearly his own and are not subject to government forfeiture." 7 Thus, based
on both statutory and constitutional grounds, the Caplin & Drysdale court
decided that attorney fee forfeiture was appropriate.
B. Removing Attorney Fees from the Purview of CFA Forfeiture -
United States v. Monsanto
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's decision, in United States v. Mon-
santo, "' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deter-
mined that a criminal defendant has a right to assets restrained under the
RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions to pay legitimate attorney fees. " 9 The
Second Circuit's decision cemented the conflict among the circuits regarding
the CFA's application to attorney fees.'
20
The district court in Monsanto considered the issue of attorney fee forfei-
ture in the context of a post-indictment restraining order issued pursuant to
112. Id. at 642.
113. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 643 ("This right to representation is fundamental to
our system, and universally recognized as an 'immutable principle of justice' implicit in due
process." (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932))).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
115. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 643.
116. Id. at 644.
117. Id. While deciding that the sixth amendment requires no special exemption for de-
fense counsel to recoup legitimate fees for services, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that fee
forfeiture raises many complex issues. Id. at 648. Specifically, the court noted that attorney
fee forfeiture could implicate issues involving a defendant's access to counsel, attorney-client
privilege, and a defendant's access to public defender services. Id. However, because the court
failed to discern any constitutional right at issue, the Fourth Circuit dismissed these concerns
as questions of policy for Congress, not the courts, to consider. Id.
118. 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
119. Id. at 1402.
120. See supra note 14.
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the CCE which precluded the defendant from using his assets to pay an
attorney of choice.121 The grand jury indictment against Monsanto con-
tained both RICO and CCE counts and listed various assets that the govern-
ment claimed were subject to forfeiture under the CCE statute.1 22 The
government moved for, and received, an order restraining the defendant's
use of the listed assets effective the same day the government filed the grand
jury indictment.
123
Monsanto moved to modify or vacate the restraining order to use his as-
sets to retain counsel.124 In addition, Monsanto asked the district court to
rule prospectively that the fees paid to his counsel would be exempt from
post-trial forfeiture. 2 ' The district court denied Monsanto's requests, find-
ing that Congress did not intend to exclude attorney fees from the CCE
forfeiture provisions, and that such provisions are constitutional. 26 How-
ever, the court noted that Monsanto could use the potentially forfeitable as-
sets to pay counsel of choice at the rates established by the Criminal Justice
Act. 127
A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed the district court decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 12  The panel decision ac-
knowledged that the post-indictment restraining order and the CFA post-
conviction forfeiture provisions apply to attorney fees and that such provi-
sions are constitutionally valid.' 29  However, the court stated that the Con-
stitution requires notice and a pretrial adversary hearing before the
government may restrain assets that a defendant could otherwise use to pay
attorney fees.1 30 The court held that at the pretrial hearing the government
must demonstrate a likelihood that the defendant will be convicted and that
the jury will find the property forfeitable. 31 Unless the government can
meet this burden at the pretrial hearing, the panel ruled, funds used to pay
legitimate attorney fees are exempt from post-conviction forfeiture. '
32
121. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1400.
122. Id. at 1401. The indictment specified two parcels of residential property, valued at
$335,000 and $30,000, as well as $35,000 in cash, as property subject to forfeiture. Id.
123. Id. The court entered an ex parte order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) prohib-





128. Id. at 1401-02.
129. Id. at 1401.
130. Id. at 1401-02.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1402.
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On remand, the district court held an adversary hearing and determined
that the government had met its requisite burden for restraining the defend-
ant's use of the assets.13 3 However, the court of appeals granted rehearing
en banc and ordered modification of the post-indictment restraining order to
allow the defendant access to his assets to retain defense counsel of
choice. ' 34 The court of appeals also held that any assets used to pay counsel
would be exempt from post-conviction forfeiture. 3 5 The court rendered its
en banc decision in a short per curiam opinion, 136 accompanied by three
plurality opinions.'
37
1. A Constitutional Analysis of the CFA: No Compelling Government
Interest
One plurality opinion in Monsanto, 138 written by Chief Judge Feinberg for
himself and two others, focused almost exclusively on constitutional rather
than statutory concerns. Chief Judge Feinberg asserted that the forfeiture
provisions of the CCE clearly applied to assets paid or owing to an attorney,
and therefore, violated the Constitution. 39 He stated that under the sixth
amendment, if a defendant has sufficient assets, his right to counsel of choice
cannot be restricted unless the government demonstrates a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.'" While the Chief Judge acknowledged the fact that the
government typically is justified in pursuing forfeiture of a defendant's illegal
assets, he noted that particular problems arise when such forfeiture prevents
a criminal defendant from retaining counsel of choice.' 4' Therefore, he con-






138. Id. (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). Judges Oakes and Kearse joined Chief Judge Fein-
berg. Judge Oakes also submitted a separate concurring opinion which stated that the sixth
amendment is implicated not only on an individual level regarding a particular defendant's
right to counsel of choice, but also on an institutional level in the attorney fee forfeiture con-
text. Id. at 1404-05 (Oakes, J., concurring). Judge Oakes similarly concluded that the CFA
was unconstitutional under the fifth amendment due process clause because it vested too much
power with the prosecutor to influence the selection of defense counsel. Id.
139. Id. at 1403 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1402.
141. Id. at 1403 (the problem arises when an accused has no funds, other than those re-
strained by the government, to retain counsel of choice).
142. The Feinberg plurality identified the governmental interests in RICO and CCE forfei-
ture as the preservation of a defendant's assets and the prevention of a defendant's use of ill-
gotten gains. Id. at 1402.
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defendant's interests143 prior to the forfeiture of assets intended for use as
attorney fees." The plurality concluded that the government's interests in
forfeiture were not sufficiently compelling to override the defendant's sixth
amendment interest. 145
Chief Judge Feinberg's plurality opinion remanded the case to the district
court, vacating the post-indictment restraining order to permit the defendant
to retain counsel of choice and prohibiting the government from seeking
post-conviction forfeiture of such fees. 146
2. A Statutory Analysis of the CFA: A Balancing of Interests
The second three-judge plurality opinion in Monsanto, 47 written by Judge
Winter, resolved the attorney fee forfeiture issue as a matter of statutory
construction, thereby avoiding the constitutional claims.' 48 Judge Winter
read the broad definition of property contained in the statute to include as-
sets the defendant intended to use to retain private counsel.'49 Similarly, he
acknowledged that attorney fees would not meet the requirements of the
bona fide purchaser exemption.' 50 However, Judge Winter contended that
the use of "may" rather than "shall" in two provisions of the RICO and
CCE statutes' 5 ' indicated Congress' intent to vest the courts with discretion
to weigh the defendant's interests against the government's interests in issu-
ing pretrial restraining orders and in exercising the third-party forfeiture
provisions.'52 The plurality asserted that the government derives no benefit
pursuant to the CFA in preventing a defendant from making ordinary lawful
143. The Feinberg plurality identified the defendant's interest as the right to retain counsel
of choice. Id.
144. Id. In analyzing the governmental interests at stake in Monsanto, the Feinberg plural-
ity noted that the government's claim of ownership to the disputed assets was only established
upon conviction. Id. at 1402-03. Therefore, such interest in the property was conditioned
upon securing a conviction. Id. Similarly, it argued that although the government maintains
an important interest in preventing the defendant's use of his ill-gotten gains, such an interest
did not outweigh a criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice. Id. at 1403.
145. Id. at 1403.
146. Id. at 1402.




150. Id. at 1409-10.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (RICO restraining order provision); 21
U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987) (CCE restraining order provision); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c)
(Supp. V 1987) (RICO third-party transfer provision); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. V 1987)
(CCE third-party transfer provision).
152. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1406 (Winter, J., concurring). The Winter plurality contended
that district courts must be guided by the traditional equitable principles that balance the
relative hardships of the parties. Id.
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expenditures including the payment of legal expenses.' 53 Thus, this plurality
determined that the defendant could use his assets to pay for defense counsel
of his choice. Judge Winter's plurality opinion applied the same balancing
rationale to preclude subsequent post-conviction forfeiture of attorney
fees. 154
3. A Procedural Analysis of the CFA: Defer to Congress
The final plurality opinion in Monsanto,'55 written by Judge Miner, for
himself and one other, analyzed the issue on procedural due process
grounds. This plurality agreed with the Monsanto panel opinion that a crim-
inal defendant's right to counsel of choice under the sixth amendment would
not be unduly infringed under the CFA if courts held adversary pretrial re-
straint hearings.'56 However, because the CFA statute did not specifically
delineate the authority for mandatory post-indictment restraint hearings, the
plurality contended that the courts could not impose such hearings without
congressional action."' Judge Miner concluded that Congress, not the
courts, should create the statute's constitutionally required procedural safe-
guards.' 58 Therefore, this plurality urged the district court to vacate the
Monsanto restraining order., 59
4. The Monsanto Dissenting Opinions: The CFA Forfeiture Provisions
Encompass Attorney Fees
The dissenting opinions in Monsanto '60 also were fragmented. One dis-
sent, written by Judge Mahoney, analyzed the issue from a statutory per-
spective. The dissent stated that the RICO and CCE statutes provide no
exemption from criminal forfeiture for attorney fees. In addition, the dissent
argued that if the government could show at a pretrial adversary hearing a
likelihood that the defendant's assets are forfeitable, the statute could be ap-
plied constitutionally to attorney fees.' 62
153. Id. at 1408, 1410-11.
154. Id. at 1410-11.






160. Id. at 1412 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
161. Id. Judge Mahoney's dissent was joined by Judges Cardamone and Pierce.
162. Id. at 1416 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 39:269
Forfeiture of Attorney Fees
The second dissent, written by Judge Pratt, 6 ' relied on the Monsanto
panel opinion. The dissent stated that a pretrial hearing is required to meet
the constitutional due process standards necessary for restraint of the de-
fendant's assets and that authority for such a hearing can be found in the
RICO and CCE statutes."' Therefore, Judge Pratt contended that the stat-
ute was constitutional and could be used to restrain assets that a criminal
defendant intended to use for attorney fees.
165
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Caplin & Drysdale and the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Monsanto raised the important statutory and constitutional
issues the circuit courts considered within the attorney fee forfeiture context.
These decisions illustrate the difficulty courts encountered in interpreting the
statute in accordance with congressional intent and constitutional principles.
The decisions also reflect the lack of consensus that existed within the courts
and among the jurisdictions regarding whether the RICO and CCE forfei-
ture provisions can be applied constitutionally to restrict a defendant's
choice of private counsel. Because Congress did not act to clarify applica-
tion of the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions with regard to attorney fees,
the United States Supreme Court moved to settle the debate.
III. CAPLIN & DRYSDALE V. UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES V.
MONSANTO: SETTLING THE CIRCUIT COURT CONTROVERSY
OVER ATTORNEY FEE FORFEITURE
In Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto, the Supreme Court held that the
federal forfeiture provisions contained in the RICO and CCE statutes do not
contain an exemption allowing a criminal defendant to use potentially for-
feitable assets to hire a defense attorney of choice' 6 6 and that such an inter-
pretation of the statutes raises no fifth or sixth amendment concerns. 167 The
Court also concluded that the statutes authorize the issuance of pretrial re-
straint orders to prevent a defendant from using potentially forfeitable assets
163. Id. at 1420 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
164. Id. In addition, the dissent disagreed with the majority's resolution of post-conviction
forfeiture under the CFA, stating that it did not feel the issue was ripe for review. Id.
165. Id. The final two dissents, written by Judges Pierce and Cardamone, concurred in
part with Judge Mahoney's dissent, relying on the Monsanto panel opinion. However, these
dissents also concurred with the majority per curiam opinion to the extent that it exempted
from post-conviction forfeiture assets, or bona fide attorney fees, that had not been the subject
of valid pretrial restraint. Id. Both dissents opposed post-conviction forfeiture of attorney fees
on the ground that, if allowed, the government, by threat of forfeiture after conviction, could
substantially limit a defendant's choice of counsel during the pretrial and trial stages of the
proceeding. Id.
166. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2662-65 (1989).
167. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2651-57 (1989).
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to pay an attorney of choice1 68 and that such judicial restraint orders are
consistent with the Constitution.
1 69
A. Interpreting the RICO and CCE Criminal Forfeiture and Pretrial
Restraint Provisions to Encompass Assets a Criminal Defendant
Needs to Retain an Attorney of Choice
1. The Majority's Statutory Analysis: Giving Effect to the Plain
a Meaning of the Statute
The Supreme Court considered the statutory challenges to the RICO and
CCE forfeiture provisions in its Monsanto decision. 70 Justice White, writing
for the majority, focused on the statute's language as determinative of its
scope. Specifically, the Court found that the forfeiture language of the stat-
ute was plain and unambiguous."'7 The majority stated that neither the stat-
ute's definition of property nor the statute's specific forfeiture mandate
contain exemptions for assets a defendant intends to use to pay attorney
fees.172 Moreover, the Court determined that the absence of an express pro-
vision in the CFA specifically permitting the forfeiture of attorney fees did
not render the Act ambiguous, but rather demonstrated the statute's
breadth. 73 Therefore, the Court found resort to the statute's legislative his-
tory for interpretation of the statute unnecessary because the "plain mean-
ing" of the statute clearly applied the forfeiture provisions to attorney
fees. 174
The Court also summarily rejected the proposition that the RICO and
CCE provisions, authorizing pretrial judicial restraint orders, contain discre-
tionary language which permit district courts to exempt from restraint assets
a defendant wishes to use to hire an attorney of choice. 17' Focusing on the
categorical nature of the statute's forfeiture provisions and the statute's pur-
pose, the majority interpreted the statute to limit district court discretion in
issuing pretrial restraint orders. ' 76 The Court stated that a district court can
only exercise its equitable discretion in determining the pretrial restraint of
assets in a manner consistent with the overall purpose of the statute. 
77
Moreover, the Court determined that Congress intended the statute to pre-
168. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
169. Id. at 2665-67.
170. Id. at 2662-65.
171. Id. at 2662.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2663 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
174. Id. at 2663-64.
175. Id. at 2664.
176. Id. at 2665.
177. Id.
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serve the availability of all assets potentially subject to forfeiture. 7 ' There-
fore, the Court's interpretation of the statute and its purpose effectively
denied the district courts any discretion in exempting assets from pretrial
restraining orders.
2. The Dissent's Statutory Analysis: Construing the Statute to Avoid
Constitutional Issues
The dissent strongly disputed the majority's statutory interpretation of the
RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions. The dissent asserted that the Court
should have interpreted the CFA to avoid forfeiture of attorney fees and to
avoid the constitutional concerns raised by such forfeiture.'79 Justice Black-
mun,' 80 writing a common dissent for Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto,
argued that the majority incorrectly interpreted the CFA forfeiture provi-
sions. Justice Blackmun based his opinion on two considerations. First, he
asserted that the discretionary language in the statutes evidenced Congress'
intent to preserve a district court's flexibility in determining the pretrial re-
straint and forfeiture of assets under the RICO and CCE provisions.' 8' Sec-
ond, Justice Blackmun contended that, in enacting the CFA, Congress
intended to minimize the economic activity of drug trafficking and racketeer-
ing operations not maximize asset forfeiture. 
82
The dissent acknowledged that the CFA contains no express language re-
lating to the forfeiture of attorney fees and that no legislative history accom-
panying the CFA specifically exempts attorney fees from forfeiture.
83
However, the dissent emphasized that Congress inserted discretionary lan-
guage in the RICO and CCE statutes to permit district courts flexibility in
determining RICO and CCE asset restraint and forfeiture.184 Justice Black-
mun contended that the majority erred in taking an overly broad view of the
CFA's purpose and in applying that purpose to require district courts to
maximize asset forfeiture.' 85 Instead, the dissent asserted that the purpose
of the CFA, as gleaned from the legislative history of the Act, was not the
maximization of assets available for forfeiture, but rather a threefold attack
on organized crime and criminal drug operations. According to Justice
Blackmun, Congress enacted the forfeiture provisions "to prevent the profits
178. Id.
179. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
181. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2669-72.
183. Id. at 2668.
184. Id. at 2669.
185. Id.
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of criminal activity from being poured into future such activity," 186 "to strip
convicted criminals of all assets purchased with the proceeds of their crimi-
nal activities,"' 187 and to prevent criminal defendants from "sheltering their
assets in order to preserve them for their own future use."'
' 88
Given the dissent's reading of the CFA, district courts operating under
the discretionary provisions could exempt from pretrial restraint assets a de-
fendant needs to retain an attorney of choice without impeding the purposes
of the Act. 189 Thus, the dissent argued that the CFA and its legislative his-
tory were susceptible to a statutory interpretation that permitted the Court
to avoid the constitutional questions.' 9 ° The dissent concluded, quoting
from the Second Circuit court's decision in Monsanto, "if anything remains
of the canon that statutes capable of differing interpretations should be con-
strued to avoid constitutional issues ... it surely applies here."' 9'
B. Dispelling the Fifth and Sixth Amendment Concerns Relating to the
Criminal Forfeiture of Attorney Fees Under the RICO
and CCE Statutes
1. The Majority's Constitutional Analysis: Rejecting Fifth and Sixth
Amendment Concerns
Having determined that the RICO and CCE statutes authorize the pre-
trial restraint and the criminal forfeiture of assets intended for attorney fees,
the Court addressed the remaining constitutional claims.
In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court rejected claims that the fifth or sixth
amendments to the Constitution require a criminal defendant access to po-
tentially forfeitable assets to pay attorney fees.192 The Court began its analy-
sis by rejecting the claim that the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions
impermissibly infringe upon a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel of choice.' 93 Justice White noted that the sixth amendment of the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to adequate represen-
tation and the right to an attorney of choice.' 94 The Court pointed out,
however, that the right to counsel of choice extends only so far as the de-
186. Id. at 2670.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2671.
190. Id. at 2671-72.
191. Id. at 2672 (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1409 (2d Cir. 1988)).
192. Id. at 2651-57.
193. Id. at 2651-56.
194. Id. at 2652.
[Vol. 39:269
Forfeiture of Attorney Fees
fendant's own resources." 5 Because the relation back provisions of the
RICO and CCE statutes vest title to potentially forfeitable assets in the gov-
ernment as of the time of the illegal act, the Court determined that under the
statute, such property does not clearly belong to the defendant. Therefore,
the Court reasoned, the sixth amendment affords no justification for a crimi-
nal defendant's use of such property to hire private counsel.196 Justice
White concluded that the Constitution does not give a criminal defendant
the right to use the government's property to pay an attorney even though
such use would further a constitutionally protected right.'9 7
The Court also supported its decision that the forfeiture provisions raise
no sixth amendment concerns based on an alternative rationale. The major-
ity posited that the government's interest in the recovery of all forfeitable
assets exceeds any potential sixth amendment interest a criminal defendant
might have in using the assets to pay for an attorney of choice.9' The Court
again accorded the defendant's interest in the property little weight, assert-
ing that the forfeiture process clouded the defendant's title to the property.
The Court stated that, in comparison, the government had a strong interest
in the property based on three considerations: the government's interest in
recovering all forfeitable property to support law enforcement efforts,' 99 the
government's restitutionary interest in returning property to persons
wrongly deprived or defrauded of it,2 ' ° and Congress' interest in depriving
organized crime and drug operations of their economic power.20' The ma-
jority concluded that these governmental interests substantially outweighed
a criminal defendant's interest in the potentially forfeitable property. 202
The Court also rejected a fifth amendment claim that the forfeiture statute
infringes upon a criminal defendant's due process rights because it allows the
government to upset the balance of power between parties in the adversarial
system. 203 Relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent, Justice White noted
that the Court will not declare a statute invalid simply because, under some
conceivable set of circumstances, the Act might operate unconstitution-
ally.2" Applying this reasoning in the forfeiture context, the majority noted
195. Id. (citing Walters' v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
196. Id. at 2653-54.
197. Id.
198. Id at 2655.
199. Id. at 2654.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2654-55.
202. Id. at 2655.
203. Id. at 2656-57.
204. Id. at 2657 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
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that absent prosecutorial abuse, the Constitution does not restrict the use of
forfeiture as a criminal sanction.2"5 Therefore, the Court denied the defend-
ant's claim that the CFA was facially invalid under the fifth amendment.2 °6
Rather, the Court deferred to the district court's power to address the issue
of prosecutorial misconduct on a case by case basis should such abuse occur
in the forfeiture context.2 °7
Finally, in Monsanto, Justice White dispelled the claim that judicial re-
straint of a defendant's assets prior to an adjudication of guilt implicates
constitutional concerns.2 °8 Specifically, the Court stated that a criminal de-
fendant's assets may be restrained by a pretrial order "based on a finding of
probable cause to believe that the assets are forfeitable., 20 9 The majority
supported this proposition by noting that prior Supreme Court decisions
permit the government to seize assets based on a finding of probable cause
that the property will be found forfeitable.210 In addition, the Court analo-
gized the pretrial restraint of assets to the situation in which circumstances
justify pretrial detention of individuals to insure their presence at trial and to
protect the community. 21' Thus, the Court found precedential and logical
support for the pretrial restraint of assets to insure their availability for
trial.212
2. The Dissent's Constitutional Analysis: Recognizing the Constitutional
Infirmities of Attorney Fee Forfeiture
The dissent began its criticism of the majority's opinion by asserting that
once the majority determined that Congress mandated the forfeiture of at-
torney fees under the CFA, the Court should have declared such provisions
unconstitutional under the sixth amendment.2"3 The dissent noted that, in
1932, the Court decided that "a defendant should be afforded a fair opportu-
nity to secure counsel of his own choice.",214 The dissent further acknowl-
edged that the Court's decisions over the past fifty years have imposed limits




208. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666-67 (1989).
209. Id. at 2666.
210. Id. (citing United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
211. Id. at 2666 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2672 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)).
215. Id.
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his dissent, Justice Blackmun asserted that the majority's decisions in Mon-
santo and Caplin & Drysdale lost sight of the complex role the right to coun-
sel of choice serves in preserving the integrity of the judicial process.2 16 The
dissent supported this contention by detailing various components within the
adversarial system that the Caplin & Drysdale Court's narrow interpretation
of the sixth amendment right to private counsel jeopardized.2" 7 Specifically,
the dissent asserted that attorney fee forfeiture, pursuant to the RICO and
CCE statutes, undermines such factors as attorney-client trust,2 18 the bal-
ance of forces between the government and the accused,21 9 and the viability
of the criminal defense bar.2 20 Justice Blackmun concluded that contrary to
the majority's decisions, the effectiveness of the adversarial system is com-
promised by attorney fee forfeiture.2 21
In addition, the dissent disputed the majority's insistence that the govern-
ment's interest in forfeiture outweighs the interest of a criminal defendant in
hiring private counsel.222  Justice Blackmun summarily discounted the
Court's claim of a governmental interest in the defendant's potentially for-
feitable assets, noting that sole title to the assets remains with the defendant
until conviction. 2  The dissent also criticized the government's asserted in-
terest in maximizing total asset forfeiture in light of the underinclusive na-
ture of the RICO and CCE third-party purchaser exemptions,224 which
permit a third-party transferee to keep assets transferred by a criminal de-
fendant provided that the purchaser was "reasonably without cause to be-
lieve that the property was subject to forfeiture. ' 225  In particular, the
dissent noted that most third-party transferees will meet the statute's bona
fide purchaser requirements with one exception, defense attorneys.22 6 Based
on the dissent's balancing of the government's interest in forfeiture against a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment interest in hiring an attorney of
choice, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Court should have declared the
CFA forfeiture provisions unconstitutional.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2672-73.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2673.
220. Id. at 2673-74.
221. Id. at 2674.
222. Id. at 2676-78.
223. Id. at 2676.
224. Id. at 2677-78.
225. Id. at 2678.
226. Id.
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C. Rejecting Ethical Considerations Arising from Attorney Fee Forfeiture
In Caplin & Drysdale, the majority dismissed the ethical challenges to the
RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions in a footnote, rejecting each of the de-
fendant's ethical claims seriatim. First, the Court determined that the bona
fide purchaser exemption of the CFA did not provide an incentive for attor-
neys to investigate inadequately RICO or CCE cases. The Court noted that
the CFA's bona fide purchaser exemption requires that a purchaser be "rea-
sonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfei-
ture. '227 However, the Court dismissed the defendant's claim that the
provision provides an incentive to attorneys not to investigate a defendant's
claim to prevent forfeiture of any legal fees received from a defendant.228
The Court reasoned that because an indictment must specify the assets sub-
ject to forfeiture, only an attorney who neglects to read the indictment could
claim the protection of the bona fide purchaser provision.229
Second, the majority rejected the defendant's claim that the CFA provides
an incentive for lawyers to accept plea bargains that require stiffer prison
sentences rather than forfeiture to protect attorney fees. The majority dis-
missed this argument, stating that should such behavior arise, the Court's
prior decisions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel could adequately
deal with the problem.23
Finally, the Court discarded the defendant's assertion that the CFA's for-
feiture provisions, in practice, created a contingent fee system for criminal
defense lawyers.23 The majority asserted that the fact that an attorney must
wait until a final case disposition to collect a fee does not necessarily make
the fee contingent.232 Furthermore, the Court stated that if the statute actu-
ally authorizes contingency fees for criminal defense work, its conflict with
professional disciplinary codes does not render the statute invalid.233
227. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2656 n.10 (1989) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B)
(Supp. V 1987)).
228. Id.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CFA: AN
OVERLY BROAD VIEW OF THE STATUTE AND ITS PURPOSE
A. A Critical Assessment of the Court's Opinions
1. An Analysis of the Court's Statutory Interpretation of the CFA
The Monsanto majority opinion relied heavily upon its interpretation of
the "plain meaning" of the CFA to establish that the RICO and CCE forfei-
ture provisions encompass assets that a criminal defendant needs to hire an
attorney of choice. Focusing on the language of the CFA, Justice White
asserted that the Act unambiguously provides that a defendant convicted of
RICO or CCE violations must forfeit to the United States any property with
a nexus to such offenses.23 The majority reasoned that because the CFA
contains no specific language authorizing an exemption for attorney fees, the
Act, as a whole, must be read to endorse the forfeiture of such assets.235 The
majority's analysis, however, minimizes the Act's discretionary language.
Congress specifically incorporated language into the CFA affording judicial
discretion in the determination of pretrial restraint orders2 36 and third-party
forfeiture.2 37 The majority's interpretation of the CFA's language construc-
tively rewrites the Act to nullify its discretionary provisions. While the ma-
jority's interpretation of the plain meaning of the Act comports with certain
provisions of the statute, the CFA language, as a whole, does not support the
majority's conclusion.
The majority's opinion also misinterprets the purpose of the CFA. The
legislative history accompanying the CFA indicates that Congress enacted
the statute to curtail economic interest in illegal drug trafficking and racke-
teering operations.238 Specifically, Congress intended the CFA provisions to
help preserve the availability of a RICO or CCE defendant's assets for crimi-
nal forfeiture.2 39 Moreover, the majority's forfeiture maximizing purpose
seems to directly contradict Congress' intent to permit district courts discre-
tion in assessing the pretrial restraint and forfeiture of assets. If Congress
intended to enact the CFA to maximize the forfeiture of RICO and CCE
associated assets, it would not have allowed district courts to exercise any
discretion that might reduce the government's total post-conviction forfei-
234. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2662 (1989) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)
(Supp. V 1987)).
235. Id. at 2664.
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
237. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Supp. V 1987).
238. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 194-97, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3377-80.
239. Id. at 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3379.
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ture.2 4 ° Rather than imposing an overly broad view of the Act's purpose,
the Court should have interpreted the purpose of the CFA in accordance
with its statutory provisions and its legislative history.
2. An Analysis of the Court's Constitutional Discussion of the CFA and
a Criminal Defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights
The majority's reasoning of the sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice issue in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto is unconvincing. More than
fifty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that the sixth amendment requires
that a criminal defendant with sufficient private resources receive a fair op-
portunity to retain counsel of choice.24 ' Subsequently, the Court recognized
various limits on a defendant's right to counsel of choice based on the gov-
ernment's interest in the orderly administration of justice.2 42 However, in
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto, the Court employed the CFA's relation
back doctrine to summarily limit a criminal defendant's right to counsel of
choice. The majority's use of this doctrine to settle the sixth amendment
issue is unsound in two respects.
First, the Court's use of the relation back doctrine to restrain a defend-
ant's assets before trial deprives a defendant of valuable rights typically asso-
ciated with property ownership.24 3 The CFA relation back provision
provides that the government's interest in forfeitable property vests at the
time of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture. 2 " Therefore, once a court
convicts a defendant of a RICO or CCE violation and the government estab-
lishes a nexus between the defendant's illegal activity and the property, the
relation back doctrine will operate to vest title of the defendant's property in
the government. However, the majority's application of the relation back
doctrine permits the government to restrain a defendant from transferring or
alienating assets to retain private defense counsel, before proving the RICO
or CCE allegations. While the Court's decisions do not vest title of the de-
fendant's assets in the government prior to conviction, the decisions do pre-
vent a defendant from exercising property rights at a critical time in the
criminal process.
240. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2669-70 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
241. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
242. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); see United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485,
488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
243. See United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 of Shop in the Grove Condominium,
853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir.) (permitting the defendant to alienate or transfer his property in order
to hire an attorney of choice), mandate stayed, 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. V 1987); see also supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Court's use of the relation back doctrine appears to conflict
directly with the sixth amendment guarantee that a defendant receive a fair
opportunity to retain counsel of choice. Under the Court's rationale, if a
defendant's assets are potentially forfeitable, such assets are without clear
title.245 Therefore, the Court suggests, if a defendant possesses only con-
tested assets, the accused's right to retain counsel of choice is not implicated
because there are no legitimate assets at the defendant's disposal.246 In prac-
tical effect, the Court's use of this rationale precludes any opportunity for
RICO or CCE defendants possessing only contested assets from ever exercis-
ing their right to retain counsel of choice. Certainly, the Court's imposition
of this objective rule depriving a certain class of defendants from any oppor-
tunity to exercise their rights to retain counsel of choice does not comport
with the fair opportunity requirement of the sixth amendment enunciated by
the Supreme Court fifty years ago.24 7
In addition, the Court's Monsanto decision incorrectly analogizes prior
Supreme Court precedent as supporting the pretrial restraint of a defend-
ant's assets in RICO and CCE cases. In its rationale for dismissing the de-
fendant's constitutional claims regarding the pretrial restraint of assets, the
majority failed to mention that the decisions it relied upon to prove Supreme
Court endorsement of asset restraint based on a finding of probable cause
involved civil forfeiture, not criminal forfeiture.248 Moreover, the majority
overlooked an essential element of its decision upholding the pretrial deten-
tion of defendants when the Court analogized that opinion with its Monsanto
pretrial restraint decision. The Court's analysis correctly cited earlier
Supreme Court precedent that a defendant may be restrained upon a finding
of probable cause that the defendant committed the crime.249 Such re-
straint, the Court stated, ensures the defendant's presence at trial and pro-
tects the community.250 However, the Court failed to recognize that its
pretrial detention decision also required a district court to assess the alterna-
tives to pretrial detention when detention would not reasonably assure the
objectives of such restraint. 25' Because the Court in Monsanto did not im-
pose a comparable demonstration that the alternatives to pretrial judicial
asset restraint would not reasonably assure both the appearance of the crimi-
nal defendant's potentially forfeitable property for trial and the safety of the
245. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653 (1989).
246. Id.
247. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
248. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 (1989) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)); Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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community, the majority's decision does not present a situation analogous to
the Court's pretrial detention decision.252
Finally, the Court's decision is troublesome because it constructively im-
poses punishment upon a RICO or CCE defendant prior to any adjudication
of guilt. A maxim of our judicial system states that punishment may not be
inflicted upon a defendant until a court has decided the defendant's guilt or
innocence. The RICO and CCE statutes provide for the loss of an offender's
property through criminal forfeiture. However, the Court's decisions in
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto permit the government to deprive a RICO
or CCE defendant of assets needed to hire an attorney of choice before trial.
The Court's decisions, in practice, inflict upon the defendant the punishment
of restraining his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice before a court
can render any determination of guilt.
3. An Analysis of the Court's Resolution of the Attorney-Client Issues
The Court's decisions in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto inadequately
address potential ethical concerns which may arise in the RICO and CCE
attorney fee forfeiture context. In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court, in a foot-
note, dismissed the defendant's claims that the CFA's forfeiture provisions
jeopardize zealous client representation, attorney-client trust, and acceptable
fee arrangements. 253 The majority's summary disposition of these claims
leaves unresolved a number of important ethical issues.
First, the Court's rationale for dispelling any potential ethical conflict be-
tween effective representation of a RICO or CCE defendant and the CFA's
bona fide purchaser exemption is unconvincing. In Caplin & Drysdale, the
defendant claimed that the bona fide purchaser provision which requires a
purchaser to be "reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture, ' '211 provided an incentive for an attorney to investigate
inadequately a defendant's case to protect any fees received from forfei-
ture. 2"5 The majority responded to the defendant's claim by reasoning that
because the government must specify in the indictment any assets it wishes
to have forfeited,256 only an attorney failing to read the indictment of a cli-
ent could accurately claim the protection of the bona fide purchaser exemp-
tion. The Court asserted that the chances of an attorney making such a
claim was unlikely.
252. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2656 n.10.
254. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1987)).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2)).
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The Court's decision, however, does not consider that although an indict-
ment must specify the defendant's assets subject to forfeiture, the govern-
ment need only state in general terms that any of the defendant's assets with
a nexus to the prohibited activity are subject to forfeiture.257 Thus, simply
reading an indictment may not provide an attorney with sufficient notice to
determine whether the listed assets are actually subject to forfeiture. More-
over, the Court's decision assumes that the attorney's act of reading the in-
dictment precludes the lawyer from being "reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. '258 Neither the CFA's
language nor the CFA's legislative history indicate that the reasonable cause
standard of the bona fide purchaser provision is met in all cases by simply
reading an indictment.259
The Court's discussion of the potential ethical claims arising from attor-
ney fee forfeiture also ignored the possible chilling effect such a policy could
have on RICO and CCE representation. Once an attorney discovers that an
indictment issued against a defendant contains a forfeiture count, the attor-
ney must elect either to decline representation of the defendant or to perform
substantial legal services without much prospect of compensation. Given
the complex nature of most CCE and RICO cases, only a remote possibility
exists that an attorney will assume the costs of representing such a client.
Finally, attorney fee forfeiture may substantially chill essential attorney-
client communication. Under the Court's interpretation of the CFA, the
benchmark for an attorney decision regarding representation of RICO or
CCE defendants is notice of possible asset forfeiture. The majority's reading
of the statute provides a strong incentive to RICO and CCE defendants to
withhold relevant information from potential attorneys. Thus, the Court's
interpretation of the CFA forfeiture provisions to include attorney fees un-
dermines the trust necessary for effective and quality representation of RICO
and CCE defendants. 2 °
257. See ASSET FORFEITURE OFFICE, CRIM. DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1 ASSET FOR-
FEITURE: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 164 (1988) (indictment need only track language of
applicable statute); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-111.000,
9-111.511 (1986) (guidelines on forfeiture of attorneys' fees discussing three ways the govern-
ment can describe property subject to forfeiture in an indictment), reprinted in 38 Crim. L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, 3001-08 (Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines].
258. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(/)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. V
1987).
259. See also DOJ Guidelines, supra note 257, § 9-111.520 ("However, the mere fact that
an indictment alleges that 'all profits or proceeds of the criminal activity' are subject to forfei-
ture will not meet the level of proof required to demonstrate reason to know.").
260. See Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent
recognized the possible chilling effect attorney fee forfeiture poses to attorney client communi-
cation. The dissent noted that "[t]he attorney's interest in knowing nothing is directly adverse
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B. Proposals for Judicial and Congressional Reform of the CFA
1. Judicial Response to Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto
In the Supreme Court's Monsanto decision, the majority declined consid-
eration of whether the due process clause requires that a hearing be held
before a pretrial restraining order may issue.2 61 Given the Court's decision
to include attorney fees within the scope of property subject to forfeiture
under the CFA, the Court must now decide what type of legal process is due
a RICO or CCE defendant prior to the issuance of a pretrial restraining
order.
A review of the Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto decisions suggests that
the Act's forfeiture provisions may indeed violate a criminal defendant's
right to procedural due process. The fifth amendment provides that a person
may not be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."'2 62 Under the fifth amendment, the Court must assess whether the
CFA forfeiture provisions deprive a RICO or CCE defendant of a property
interest and whether the statute permits such deprivation without due pro-
cess of law.26 3
The Court's decisions in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto permit the gov-
ernment to assert a property interest in the defendant's assets through the
relation back doctrine and to restrain such assets prior to trial, even though
title to the property remains vested in the defendant until conviction.
Clearly, the defendant's inability to alienate his property indicates some dep-
rivation of property rights.2"4 Moreover, the CFA does not permit a defend-
ant to argue the merits of the government's forfeiture allegations before the
to his client's interest in full disclosure. The result of the conflict may be less rigorous investi-
gation of the defendant's circumstances, leading in turn to a failure to recognize or pursue
avenues of inquiry necessary to the defense." Id.; see also Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-
30 (9th Cir. 1960) ("there is the countervailing necessity of insuring the right of every person
to freely and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its
practice, in order that the former may have adequate advice and a proper defense"); cf
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981) ("A client must feel free to
discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain infor-
mation beyond that volunteered by his client.").
261. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 n. 10 (1989). Specifically, the Court
stated that it did not address the due process issue for two reasons. First, the Court did not
consider the issue because the government, requesting consideration of the issue, won its case
in the district court despite the imposition of a hearing. Id. Second, the majority noted that
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the due process issue in its en banc
decision, thus the Supreme Court did not need to consider the issue. Id.
262. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
263. See United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1353 (1989).
264. Id. at 725-26.
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issuance of a restraining order, 265 nor does the statute require a district court
to hold a pretrial restraint hearing.26 6 Therefore, the Court's interpretation
of the CFA appears to permit the government to deprive a RICO or CCE
defendant of property to hire an attorney of choice, without guaranteeing the
defendant an adequate opportunity to respond to the government's restraint
allegations within a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner as required
by the due process clause.2 67 Given the impact of the Court's decisions on a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights, the Supreme Court must now
settle the fifth amendment procedural due process issue.
2. Congressional Response to Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto
The Supreme Court's decisions in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto also
disturb the delicate balance between protecting the criminal defendant's con-
stitutional rights and furthering the public's vital interest in deterring racke-
teering and illegal drug operations which Congress forged in the criminal
forfeiture provisions of the CFA.2 6 8 In practical effect, the majority's opin-
ion rewrites the discretionary provisions of the CFA nearly to eliminate their
operation. At a minimum, Congress should amend the CFA to clarify the
discretion accorded district courts in determining the pretrial restraint and
the forfeiture of assets under the RICO and CCE provisions. Specifically,
the amendment should reiterate Congress' intent that district courts retain
the authority to exempt from RICO and CCE post-indictment restraint and
forfeiture provisions assets that a criminal defendant needs to retain private
counsel. The amendment should also state that it is within the discretion of
the district courts to supervise any transfers of potentially forfeitable assets
in order to determine whether the attorney fees are made in good faith. This
amendment would permit the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions to func-
tion as Congress originally intended.
Moreover, Congress should amend the CFA to require district courts to
conduct expedited adversarial hearings to consider the scope of any pretrial
restraint order freezing a criminal defendant's assets. Presently, the CFA
provides that courts "may" enter a restraining order or injunction, or re-
quire a bond, or take any other action to preserve a criminal defendant's
assets that are subject to forfeiture.269 The legislative history accompanying
265. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 202, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3385-86.
266. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. V
1987).
267. See Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 729.
268. See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
269. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1).
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this provision states that Congress did not "exclude ...the authority to
hold a hearing subsequent to the initial entry of the order." 270 Amending
this provision to require district courts to hold an adversary pretrial hearing
would provide a forum in which courts could exercise their discretion as to
whether and to what extent a defendant's assets should be restrained.27 1
Enactment of an amendment requiring an adversary restraint hearing also
would protect a RICO and CCE defendant's right to counsel of choice both
on an individual and an institutional level. First, a pretrial adversary hear-
ing would promote participation by private attorneys to represent RICO and
CCE defendants. The Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto majority's decisions
chill any defense counsel initiative to represent RICO and CCE defendants
in extended trials because of the possibility that the defendant's assets will be
subject to forfeiture after trial. 2 An adversary pretrial hearing would rein-
troduce an incentive for defense attorneys to represent aggressively and zeal-
ously RICO and CCE defendants in short pretrial proceedings wherein a
court would determine whether the defendant may utilize restrained assets
to retain counsel of choice for trial.
Second, a pretrial restraint hearing would provide an important proce-
dural check on the government's power to obtain a restraining order limiting
a RICO and CCE defendant's choice of counsel by including a forfeiture
count in the indictment.273 Requiring the government to present the merits
of its restraint allegations in a pretrial adversary hearing would provide addi-
tional judicial control over the government's ability to affect a RICO and
CCE defendant's choice of counsel. Similarly, such a hearing would permit
district courts to balance issues such as the government's interest in the re-
straint, the relative hardships on the parties should a restraint order issue,
270. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, at 203, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3386. The only restriction Congress specifically imposed on courts with regard to
conducting a restraint hearing was that courts were not to look behind the validity of the
government's indictment. Id.
271. See United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d
249 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The court is not free to question whether the grand jury should have
acted as it did, but it is free, and indeed required, to exercise its discretion as to whether and to
what extent to enjoin based on all matters developed at the hearing.").
272. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 82 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987), vacated, 852 F.2d 1400
(2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989); see also Nat'l L.J., Aug. 28, 1989, at 3, col. 1. The
article notes that a prominent Miami criminal attorney stopped taking international drug cases
for fear of fee forfeiture. Id. (citing Nat'i L.J., Aug. 14, 1989, at 2, col. 3). In addition, the
new president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers stated that he has
heard from a dozen criminal defense lawyers who are also quitting criminal practice due to the
possibility of attorney fee forfeiture. Id. at 9.
273. See Monsanto, 836 F.2d. at 82; United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D.
Colo. 1985).
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and the public's interest in the restraint.2 74 An adversary pretrial hearing to
assess these issues would reestablish a RICO and CCE defendant's "fair op-
portunity" to secure defense counsel of choice. Thus, such hearings would
ensure adequate protection of a RICO and CCE defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights on an individual and institutional level.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted criminal forfeiture provisions in the RICO and CCE
statutes in order to deter racketeering and drug trafficking operations. In
1984, Congress passed the CFA, amending the RICO and CCE statutes to
improve the scope and efficiency of the criminal forfeiture provisions. The
CFA amendments generated substantial controversy concerning whether the
government could apply the Act's forfeiture provisions to assets a criminal
defendant needs to retain defense counsel of choice.
In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States and United States v. Monsanto, the
United States Supreme Court held that the federal forfeiture provisions con-
stitutionally encompass assets that a criminal defendant uses or intends to
use to hire private counsel. In addition, the Court decided that the pretrial
restraint provisions of the statutes can be applied to a defendant's assets
needed to retain counsel of choice. These decisions accord the Federal Gov-
ernment a powerful weapon for use in the fight against illegal drug traffick-
ing and racketeering operations.
Unfortunately, the Court's decisions confer more enforcement power than
necessary to federal prosecutors. The majority's interpretation bestows little
protection for a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice and fifth amendment due process right. In deciding Caplin & Drys-
dale and Monsanto, the Supreme Court distorted the balance between the
public's interest in deterring illegal drug and racketeering enterprises and a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court
and Congress must take steps to restore the balance between those interests.
Kathleen C. Van 01st
274. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666-67 (1989).
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